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Going Against the Current: How Aereo’s Online Streaming Left Copyright Laws 
Adrift 
By: Vani Parti 
 
Part I: Introduction 
 
More than five million U.S. homes today have “Zero-TV.”  Residents of those 
homes no longer watch traditional television offered by cable or satellite providers, but 
instead stream videos online through the Internet.1  According to Nielsen’s 2013 Cross 
Platform Report, almost half of Americans under the age of thirty-five live in Zero-TV 
homes—evidencing an important change in the delivery of media.2  Over the last several 
years, the shift towards dropping cable plans in favor of à la carte online streaming 
services has been attributed to viewers’ concerns about the high costs of cable television 
and disinterest in cable bundling.3  The rapid and broad expansion of the Internet TV has 
raised significant issues, which the legal system has attempted to solve through piecemeal 
decisions.  One specific problem, addressed by the United States Supreme Court, is how 
the public performance right and the Transmit Clause of the Copyright Act apply to new 
emerging technologies.   
In 2012, Chet Kanojia, with a team of engineers, lawyers, marketers and even an 
Olympic medalist launched a digital start-up, Aereo, transforming the way people watch 
                                                 
1
  Zero-TV Doesn’t Mean Zero Video, NIELSEN, (Nov. 9, 2014, 10:04 AM) 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2013/zero-tv-doesnt-mean-zero-video.html. 
2
  A Look Across Media: The Cross-Platform Report Q3 2013, NIELSEN, (Nov. 9, 2014, 10:14 AM) 
http://www.nielsen.com/content/corporate/tw/en/insights/reports/2013/a-look-across-media-the-cross-
platform-report-q3-2013.html.
 
3
  Id. 
television.4  This technology captured broadcasters’ TV signals using thousands of tiny 
remote antennas and made them available in the cloud5  for consumers to watch 
television anywhere on any Internet-connected device, and most importantly without 
paying an expensive cable bill. Aereo’s technology focused on the inherent right of any 
viewer to receive free over-the-air broadcasts by attaching an antenna to a TV and 
scanning for channels.  The team, however, deliberately designed Aereo to fall squarely 
within a legal loophole that circumvents copyright laws. This loophole resulted from the 
current Copyright Act and a 2008 ruling by the Second Circuit.   
In June 2014, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States triggered 
Aereo’s shutdown because even though its crafty workaround would have been arguably 
lawful, the petitioners, Broadcasters, would lose billions in retransmissions fees from 
cable companies if Aereo was allowed to exploit a legal loophole. 
Although the United States Supreme Court effectively ended Aereo, Broadcasters’ 
business model is in danger because Aereo users showed their willingness to forego cable 
and satellite for a small amount of money.  Thus the question remains—does the 
Copyright Act confer a monopoly on Broadcasters that stunts budding technologies like 
Aereo, or do the goals of copyright warrant a different result?  
                                                 
4
  David Carr, Aereo Case Will Shape TV’s Future, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Apr. 20, 2014) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/business/media/aereo-case-will-shape-tvs-future.html.
 
5
  The cloud is defined as a communications network or a datacenter full of 
servers connected to the Internet, which allows remote data access and storage. See 
PCMAG DIGITAL GROUP, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/39847/cloud (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2015). 
This Note addresses the current effort to solve the Transmit Clause problem: 
misinterpretation and misapplication of the 1976 Copyright Act to today’s technology, 
such as Internet Television.  Part II considers the origins and the evolution of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, the subsequent development of the Transmit Clause, and the 
Court’s latest effort to resolve the statutory interpretation problems encountered with the 
Transmit Clause in ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.  Part III suggests that Congress should amend 
the Copyright Act in view of technological, regulatory, and political perspectives.  Part IV 
proposes a new licensing scheme and device-shifting exception for Congress to adopt in 
lieu of a new Copyright Act that would resolve the disparities in copyright law by 
favoring societal demands for current technology. 
This Note concludes that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Transmit 
Clause in Aereo unfairly discriminates against other uses of copyrighted works, 
particularly Internet TV, endangers the development of cloud computing technologies, 
and threatens to substantially limit the emergence of similar advanced technology 
available to the public at a cheaper cost.   
Part II: Overview 
A. Legislative History and Statutory Background 
Rapid technological change is the fundamental force behind the development of 
modern copyright law.  The earliest copyright laws were a reaction to the economic and 
cultural conditions caused by the Fifteenth Century technology of printing with movable 
type in Europe.6  When the United States adopted copyright laws, the Framers of the 
                                                 
6
  See generally CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW (9th ed. 2013). 
Constitution recognized the need to reward “authors” and “maximize the welfare of 
society as a whole” through the economic incentive of granting a monopoly right for a 
limited time.7  Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution states that Congress 
shall have the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”8   
The scope of copyright has greatly expanded over the past three centuries.  Today, 
the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”) grants six exclusive rights to copyright holders.9  
Section 106 of the 1976 Act provides copyright owners the exclusive right “to do or to 
authorize” reproduction, distribution, adaptation, performance, display, and digital 
performance.10  Copyright owners can protect their rights against direct infringement by 
showing prima facie copyright ownership and an unauthorized exercise of one or more of 
their exclusive rights.11  Similarly, copyright holders can enforce their rights against 
                                                 
7
  Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810; see generally CRAIG ALLEN NARD ET 
AL., THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 367 (3d ed. 2011) (detailing the history of 
copyright law and the Copyright Act). 
8
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
9
  See generally Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 
(codified in various sections at 17 U.S.C.). 
10
  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2014). 
11
  Fox TV Stations v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1142 
(C.D. Cal. 2012). 
indirect infringement under secondary liability theories, including contributory and 
vicarious infringement.12 
 The Act was in part a reaction to the absolute freedom enjoyed by cable systems 
under judicial constructions of the Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”).  For example, in 
the 1950s, the Cable television industry placed “community antennas” on top of 
mountains and transmitted local broadcast signals to subscribers using coaxial cables.13  
At the time, this service was one of a kind and provided signals where hilly terrains or 
rural lifestyles made receiving broadcast signals difficult.14  Given that this practice 
increased viewership, Broadcasters were satisfied and recouped revenues primarily 
through advertising.15  However, copyright owners became dissatisfied with this service 
because cable imported distant signals and aired copyrighted content without paying 
appropriate licensing fees.16  This practice was particularly problematic because 
copyright owners did not receive any compensation for the increased viewership of their 
                                                 
12
  Indirect Infringement, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCHOOL, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/indirect_infringement (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
13
  Fred H. Cate, Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright License, 42 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 191, 193 (1990). 
14
  See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 391–92 
(1968). 
15
  Cate, supra note 13, at 238. 
16
  Id. 
content; copyright owners also lost money because more houses switched from local 
broadcasters, the only companies paying for the copyright licenses, to cable.17  
Unsatisfied copyright holders began voicing their concerns.  Yet, the United States 
Supreme Court held no copyright liability for cable retransmissions of commercial 
television broadcasts to subscribers in two decisions: Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc.,18 and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System.19  In 
Fortnightly, the Court held that the cable company did not infringe the plaintiff’s 
performance right because community antenna television (“CATV”) systems did nothing 
more than “enhance the viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals” and 
therefore passive reception and retransmission did not infringe upon the copyright.20  Six 
years later, in Teleprompter, the Court reaffirmed Fortnightly by holding that CATV 
systems reception and retransmission even from distant or secondary markets, did not 
constitute a performance under the 1909 Act because CATV passively rechanneled 
already-released material.21  As a result of these decisions, under the 1909 Act, cable 
                                                 
17
  Id.  
18
  392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
19
  415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
20
  Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399. 
21
  Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 410. 
television operators were free from copyright liability—this severely affected the market 
structure of television broadcasting and copyright licensing.22   
Since the 1909 Act failed to minimize cable’s impact on copyright holders, the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) became concerned about the unfair and 
uncompensated use of copyrights and the harm to local broadcasters.23  Consequently, 
the FCC proposed regulations that required cable companies to obtain retransmission 
consent for content that distant broadcasting stations transmitted.24  This effectively 
stunted growth in the cable industry as no broadcasting station gave consent because it 
would require fee sharing with copyright owners.25   
Congress further delayed the pronouncement of a new copyright act because of 
various pressures from the cable industry, the broadcasters, and the copyright owners.26  
By the early 1970s, no one was satisfied with the excessive and unworkable 
regulations.27  In 1976, Congress stepped in and passed the Act, which represents the 
                                                 
22
  2-8 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.18(E). 
23
  Cate, supra note 13, at 195–196. 
24
  In the Matter of Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between Television 
Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 650 (1979). 
25
  Id. at 651. 
26
  H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5703 [hereinafter cited as “House Copyright Report”]. 
27
  Leslie Swackhamer, Cable-Copyright: The Corruption of Consensus, 6 
COMM/ENT L.J. 283, 288 (1983). 
cable industry’s compromise with the FCC to accept less restrictive regulations in 
exchange for partial copyright liability.28  The Act primarily required cable companies to 
specify that cable retransmission is a public performance subject to full copyright 
liability.29  After passing the Act, Congress found it impractical and unduly burdensome 
for cable companies to negotiate ad hoc copyright licenses; thus, Congress established a 
compulsory copyright license system for cable.30  In providing this compulsory licensing 
system to the cable industry, Congress subsidized the cable industry by recognizing the 
public demand for cable and its potential benefits.  This allowed the nascent cable 
industry to survive beyond copyright law. 
To understand how copyright law almost eliminated the cable industry, it is 
important to look at the language provided in the Act.  The performance right under the 
Act departs from prior law because Section 101 defines the right to “perform the . . . 
work publicly” as showing a motion picture or other audiovisual work’s images or 
making its sounds audible “by means of any device or process” at a place open to the 
public.31  
 Since the advancement of digital transmissions, Congress revised the Act several 
times to reflect the applicability to cable systems. First, relating to television 
                                                 
28
  See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d 143, 165–68 (1972). 
29
  Cate, supra note 13, at 202. 
30
  Id.  
31
  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014). 
programming, Congress defined the word “perform” to mean any provider “showing an 
image in any sequence” as a performance.32  Then, Congress clarified the term 
“publicly” in two clauses.  The first clause covers performances in public places, while 
the second, the “Transmit Clause” covers transmission of performances either (1) to 
public places or (2) “to the public.”33  The Transmit Clause has been under fire for a lack 
of clarity ever since Congress wrote it.34 The Transmit Clause states that performing a 
work publicly includes:  
[T]o transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the 
work to a place specified by clause (1) or the public, by means of any 
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving 
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same or different times.35 
 
The legislative history is instructive in understanding this Clause; it explains that public 
performance includes not only an initial rendition or a showing, but also any further act 
that transmits any rendition of the work to the public.36  Thus, a singer is performing 
when he or she sings a song, a cable television system is performing when it retransmits a 
broadcast to its subscribers, and an individual is performing whenever he or she turns on 
                                                 
32
  Id. 
33
  See generally, John Kheit, Public Performance Copyrights: A Guide To Public 
Place Analysis, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1999). 
34
  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 468 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
35
  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014).  
36
  H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976). 
a television receiving signals.37  Although all of these acts are considered performances, a 
performance alone is not actionable under the Act.  For infringement to occur, one must 
perform in a public place or to the public. 
Congress’ purpose behind enacting the Transmit Clause was to make the activities 
of cable companies outside the scope of copyright.  But, to protect innovation and the 
public, and help cable companies avoid unequal negotiations with copyright holders, 
Congress simultaneously adopted Section 111.38  Section 111 of the Act grants eligible 
cable systems a compulsory license in exchange for copyright royalty payments for the 
use of distant network transmissions.39  Although Section 111 defines a cable system 
broadly enough to include retransmission carriers, Congress limits the compulsory 
license only to cable systems.40  Because of the compulsory licensing and technological 
advancements, the cable industry has evolved into more than just a method to aid 
broadcast reception in rural areas—it is now a viable communications medium.41 
                                                 
37
  Id. 
38
  Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Systems, Inc., 777 F.2d 393, 
396 (8th Cir. 1985). 
39
  Local signals need not be paid for, because their retransmission does not 
damage the copyright holder. House Report, supra note 26, at 90, reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5704.  
40
  M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8.18[B], at 8-196 to 8-197 (1982)(stating intent of 
Congress, to provide for liability for the retransmission of a copyrighted work); 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)-(d) 
(Supp. V. 1981). 
41
  Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 278, 312 
(2004); see Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 
B. Courts Defining the Transmit Clause 
While Congress enacted the Act during a time of analog technology.  Since then, 
courts have addressed the numerous advances in technologies.42  In 1983, the Supreme 
Court upheld the use of Betamax recorders, an early version of the VCR, to allow 
television viewers to time-shift and record programs to view later.43  The Court did not 
find the Copyright Act to prohibit television viewers from time-shifting content, nor did it 
find anything that would prohibit the sale of time-shifting devices because of fair use.44  
Section 107 of the Act, fair use, excepts time-shifting technology because of its 
“substantial non-infringing uses.”45  The four-factor fair use test establishes that if an 
individual user can establish a fair use defense, then her conduct cannot base secondary 
infringement on facilitating that use for a manufacturer.46 
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S.C. 521(a)(2)-(5) (2000) (detailing the increase in cable viewership and noting that 
“the cable television industry has become a dominant nationwide video medium”). 
42
  See, e.g., Mitchell Zimmerman & Chad Woodford, Cartoon Network v. 
Cablevision--Buffer Reproductions Are Not Infringing Copies, Holds Second Circuit In 
“Remote” DVR Case, 13 No. 8 CYBERSPACE LAW. 9 (2008) (summarizing the court's 
reasoning to uphold the DVR after courts upheld a traditional VCR).  
43
  See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984). 
44
  Id. at 448. 
45
  Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
46
  Id. 
In 2008, the Second Circuit analyzed the Transmit Clause in Cartoon Network LP, 
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (“Cablevision”)47 and explained that a performance is 
“public” only when the audience receiving the transmission is not an individual, but 
multiple members of the public.48  The court upheld cloud-based RS-DVRs where each 
individual subscriber created a unique copy or recording that constituted a private 
performance because Cablevision was not sharing the sole original copy publically by 
definition.49  Another Second Circuit court decision discussing the legality of 
Cablevision’s operations further clarified, “if 10,000 Cablevision customers wished to 
record the Super Bowl, Cablevision would create 10,000 copies of the broadcast, one for 
each customer.”50  Thus, Cablevision recognized that the Transmit Clause renders legally 
irrelevant the location of customers during a performance.51   
To determine who or what constitutes as “the public” under the Transmit Clause, 
the court focused on the transmission and its potential audience, not the original telecast, 
because the potential audience for every copyrighted work is the public.52  The court then 
                                                 
47
  Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
48
  Id. at 140. 
49
  Id.  
50
  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686 (2d Cir. 2013). 
51
  Id. at 687. 
52
  Id.  
interpreted the law to not aggregate multiple transmissions of the same underlying work 
if each transmission was made to an individual not the “public” because aggregating all 
performances together would render the “to the public” language in the Transmit Clause 
moot.53  This interpretation of the Transmit Clause has caused various companies, 
including Aereo, FilmOn LLP, and ivi, Inc. to design inventions according to the 
Cablevision decision’s requirements.54 
C. Internet TV Woes 
Although online services like Hulu and Netflix originally provided only 
previously-aired content, the online streaming industry has since changed.55  Today, 
Netflix and Amazon produce their own original series and provide quality original 
content.56  Netflix’s Chief Content Officer, Ted Sarandos explained that developing its 
own programming allows Netflix to avoid huge marketing costs.57  Unlike serialized 
dramas on broadcast TV, which require constant advertising, the original content strategy 
                                                 
53
  Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135-37. 
54
  See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498(2014); Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. 
FilmOn X LLC, 968 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2013); WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 
275 (2d Cir. 2012). 
55
  See generally, Eric Sherman, 3 Ways Streaming Video Will Change the TV 
Industry, CBS MONEY WATCH (Mar. 31, 2011, 7:13 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/3-ways-streaming-video-will-change-the-tv-industry. 
56
  Alex Ben Block, Netflix’s Ted Sarandos Explains Original Content Strategy, 
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, (Apr. 7, 2012, 11:26 AM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/netflix-ted-sarandos-original-content-309275. 
57
  Id. 
requires a one-time investment to draw users instead of weekly marketing.58  
Consequently, Netflix has more money to spend on buying more content and making 
premium content available for streaming.59 Other online content providers such as 
Amazon, HBOGo, and more recently Yahoo! are following suit.  Changes to content 
production and marketing are creating competitive alternative programming to the 
conventional TV outlet.60 
With these changes, more than sixty years after the advent of cable, the fledgling 
Internet TV industry—in a similar position to the cable industry in 1976—demands a 
rewrite to the copyright laws for much of the same reasons as when cable caused the 
passage of the Act.  
Aereo is at the center of this debate.61  Unlike Netflix and Hulu, Aereo allows its 
users to watch and record live broadcast television over the Internet and store up to 
twenty hours of recorded content on cloud servers.62  Aereo’s system allows subscribers 
                                                 
58
  Id. 
59
  Id.; Eric Deggans, Netflix Snaps Up TV Shows Rejected By Networks, NPR 
(Mar. 6, 2015, 5:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/06/391149256/netflix-snaps-up-tv-
shows-rejected-by-networks; Netflix is not only investing money in rescuing shows that 
have been on broadcast networks and cable such as Arrested Development and The 
Killing, but Netflix is also releasing a show like Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt, which 
was originally made for NBC. Id. 
60
  Id. 
61
  See AEREO, www.aereo.com (last visited Jan. 23, 2014). 
62
  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d at 681. 
direct control over a single personal antenna available from thousands of dime-sized 
antennas that are dedicated to capturing over-the-air broadcasts.63  A brief delay in the 
“watch” function ensures that the television program is not actually transmitted live.64  
This delay is important because it allows Aereo to be within the judicial interpretation of 
time-shifting technologies.65  
Upon user request, Aereo sends the end-user a unique copy of the designated 
program to view on any Internet-connected device.66  By assigning each user an 
individual antenna, Aereo repurposes an old technology to avoid retransmission liability 
by transmitting a series of private, unique performances.67  The individual antennas create 
individual copies of each program and the private copy is only available to the particular 
subscriber who selected the broadcast.68  Aereo functions as a combination of “a standard 
TV antenna, a DVR, and a Slingbox-like device.”69   
                                                 
63
  Id. 
64
  Id. 
65
  Timeshift is considered fair use. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
66
  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d at 682. 
67
  See Adrianne Jeffries, Who’s Afraid of a Little Live TV? Why Streaming Service 
Aereo Scares the Broadcast Industry, VERGE, (Nov. 13, 2014, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/ 2012/11/13/3628402/aereo-streaming-live-tv-broadcasters. 
68
  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d at 682–83. 
69
Broadcasters are dissatisfied with this invention because Aereo is able to exploit 
their content without paying licensing fees.70  Furthermore, compared to the average cost 
of basic cable at eighty-six dollars per month, Aereo offers over-the-air broadcasts to 
consumers for just eight dollars per month.71   
As with cable, Betamax, VCRs, and DVRs, Broadcasters sued Aereo for 
copyright infringement.72  The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York found that Cablevision controlled and that the broadcasters “failed to 
demonstrate [that] they are likely to succeed in establishing that Aereo’s system results in 
a public performance.”73   
The Court of Appeals relied on Cablevision to establish “four guideposts” to 
interpret the Transmit Clause and determine that Aereo did not publically perform.74  
                                                                                                                                                 
  Id. at 682; “Slingbox is a hardware device that transmits signals from a cable or 
satellite television connection to a personal computer over the Internet. The device, which 
is manufactured and distributed by Sling Media, is intended for TV placeshifting with 
individual computers.” available at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Slingbox. 
70
  See Associated Press, Fox Exec: “We Can't Sit Idly by and Let [Aereo] Steal 
Our Signal’, ENT. WKLY. (Nov. 9, 2014, 9:23 AM), 
http://insidetv.ew.com/2013/04/09/fox-exec-we-cant-sit-idly-by-and-let-aereo-steal-our-
signal (describing how broadcast networks have threatened to take their networks off-the-
air and make them subscription only). 
71
  Id. 
72
  Id. 
73
  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
74
  WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d at 689. 
First, the Transmit Clause considers the potential audience by asking whether the 
transmission is “capable of being received by the public; the transmission is not a public 
performance if an individual user views it.”75  Second, the Transmit Clause does not 
aggregate the individual performance with the original performance, which means that it 
does not matter if the public is capable of receiving the original work; only the audience 
for the individual transmission matters.76  Third, if a single copy generates a 
transmission for multiple users, then the transmissions are public performances even if 
only one individual receives it.77  Fourth, “any factor that limits the potential audience of 
a transmission is relevant” to the Transmit Clause analysis.78  
Alternatively, the Central District of California District Court interpreted the 
Transmit Clause by focusing on the commercial nature of the transaction to determine if 
the transmission infringed the performance right.79  For example, a district court in 
California granted a preliminary injunction against a DVD rental company that streamed 
movies online because the enterprise was commercial in nature and unlike Cablevision 
                                                 
75
  Id. (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135). 
76
  Id. (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135-38). 
77
  Id. (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 137-38). 
78
  Id. (quoting Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 137). 
79
  Fox TV Stations v. BarryDriller Content Sys., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 
2012). 
where an individual copy for each individual user existed; here, a single DVD was used 
for multiple users.80   
In 2012, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California 
also rejected Cablevision’s reasoning and enjoined Aereokiller, a similar system to Aereo, 
because it was a commercial enterprise and its operations required royalty payments.81  
On the other hand, California case law suggests that a court must interpret any 
transmission as open to the public if the transmission is of a commercial copyrighted 
work that was initially open to the public.82  
More recently, however, the Central District of California District Court refused 
to extend Aereo to Dish Network’s technology and affirmed the denial of Fox 
Broadcasting’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief against Dish Network’s online 
streaming services such as Dish Anywhere and Hopper Transfers because Fox did not 
suffer any irreparable harm.83  Dish Network argued that the Aereo decision carved out 
exceptions for subscribers sending content they already owned to a different device.84   
                                                 
80
  Warner Bros. Entm’t v. WTV Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 
2011). But cf. BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (9th Circuit also upheld denial of 
preliminary injunction against Dish networks in a suit brought by Fox, on the basis that 
even though US had decided Aereo, Fox failed to show irreparable harm if Preliminary 
Injunction not granted). 
81
  BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1145. 
82
  On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790 
(N.D. Cal. 1991). 
83
  BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. 
84
  
D. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. 
To resolve this circuit split, on June 25, 2014, the United States Supreme Court 
reversed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc..85 The 
Court restricted their inquiry to two parts: “does Aereo ‘perform’ at all?  And … if so, 
does Aereo do so ‘publicly’?”86   
The Court stated that the Act’s language alone does not indicate when an entity 
performs or transmits and when it merely supplies the equipment for another to 
perform.87  However, the Court concluded that when the language is read together with 
the Act’s purpose, “[a]n entity that engages in activities like Aereo’s performs.”88   
To understand the Act’s purpose, the Court turned to the Act’s legislative history 
and stated that Congress enacted the Act to overrule Fortnightly and Teleprompter.89  
                                                                                                                                                 
  Gina M. McCreadie and Troy K. Liberman, Ninth Circuit refuses to extend 
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The Court also asserted that the Act adopted the Transmit Clause and Section 111 because 
Congress intended to bring cable systems within the scope of the Copyright Act.90  
Consequently, the Court concluded that because “Aereo’s activities are substantially 
similar to those of the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach,” 
technological differences were not enough to overlook Congress’s purpose, which was 
meant to target companies like Aereo.  
Considering whether Aereo performed publically, under the Transmit Clause, the 
Court noted that the technological differences of Aereo’s system did not distinguish it 
from cable systems, which perform publically according to Congress’ regulatory 
objectives.91  Further interpreting the language of the Transmit Clause, the Court posited 
that “[t]he fact that a singular noun (‘a performance’) follows the words ‘to transmit’” 
does not mean that an entity is not liable when it transmits a performance through several 
transmissions of the same work instead of one transmission.92  Thus, an entity publically 
performs when it communicates a performance to people, “regardless of the number of 
discrete communications it makes.”93  
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Additionally, the Court found that because the Act applies to transmissions “by 
means of any device or process,” user-specific copies are a means of transmission.94  
The Court adopted this rationale because of Congress’s limited understanding of 
“devices” at the time of writing the Act.  In 1976, devices that could transmit audiovisual 
content included television sets and movie projectors.  Although Congress included “any 
device” thwarting future inventions from transmitting, in 1976, Congress had not 
envisioned the boom of the digital era and consumer dependence on digital devices.  
Finally, the Court limited its holding by reasoning that Aereo’s performance does not 
determine the performance of other providers in a different context.95  
Dissenting, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito, concluded 
that Aereo did not perform at all.  Justice Scalia criticized the majority for concluding a 
performance by adopting a “looks-like-cable-TV” standard, which is not found in the 
Transmit Clause.96   
In a section aptly titled “Guilt by Resemblance,” Justice Scalia discussed what he 
called majority’s “trio of defects” in reasoning.97  First, the dissent noted that the 
majority’s interpretation of Congress’s purpose is based on a faulty method of analyzing 
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select portions of the legislative history.98  Second, the dissent distinguished CATV 
systems which “captured the full range of broadcast signals,” from Aereo’s system that 
“transmits only specific programs selected by the user, at specific times selected by the 
user.”99  The dissent found this to be significant because, in 1974, cable systems selected 
specific programs to import and were not merely passive carriers.100  Lastly, the dissent 
rebuked the majority for replacing the bright-line volitional conduct test to determine 
direct liability of copyright infringement with a “looks-like-cable-TV” test.101 In doing 
so, the majority also conflated direct infringement and secondary infringement.102   
The networks like ABC, NBC, CBS, in their complaint stated that Aereo directly 
infringed, but to make a claim for direct infringement, the significant inquiry is who is 
performing.103  To find a defendant directly liable, a volitional act that violates the Act is 
necessary.104  The dissent bolstered this proposition by stating that the Act “defines 
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‘perform’ in active, affirmative terms.”105  Thus, to find Aero directly liable, Aereo must 
be the one performing.  However, since Aereo remains inert until Aereo’s “subscribers 
log in, select a channel, push the ‘watch’ button”, Aereo does not perform; the users 
directly perform.106 
 Justice Scalia analogized Aereo to “a copy shop that provides its patrons with a 
library card,” because Aereo does nothing except respond to the customer’s activities.107  
Similarly, a copy shop’s culpability can only be that of secondary infringement because 
the customer who chose the content and activated the copy function would be directly 
liable.108  Unlike video-on-demand services that actively select and arrange the content, 
Aereo simply allots an antenna to an individual user, and the user chooses and selects 
from any freely available content.109  
Consequently, Justice Scalia found that the majority distorted the Copyright Act to 
reach their outcome.110  Justice Scalia also correctly pointed out that the Court was 
opening the door to multiple litigation quibbles about which technologies would fall 
within or outside the statute because of their adoption of the vague “looks-like-cable-TV” 
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standard.111  To conclude, Justice Scalia commented, “It is not the role of the Court to 
identify and plug loopholes.  It is the role of good lawyers to identify and exploit them, 
and the role of Congress to eliminate them if it wishes.”112 
Part III: Reasons for Congress to Amend the Copyright Act  
Allowing companies to design technologies that comply with copyright laws is 
precisely what Congress intended the existing laws to do.  Our legal system should not 
punish those who deliberately follow the rule of law and rely on the law’s predictability.  
Aereo did just that.  Instead, Congress, not the courts, should reexamine the law against 
the new technology and write laws that would facilitate a different result.  
A. Regulatory Reasons 
1. No Predictability in the Law/Statutory Interpretation Inconsistency 
 
Since the enactment of the Transmit Clause (the “Clause”), various court opinions 
have turned on how to interpret the language in the Clause.  While the Supreme Court in 
Aereo applied a “looks-like-cable-TV” test, other courts have adopted different methods 
to interpret the Clause.113  This interpretation problem is causing a failure of our legal 
system’s values that stress the importance of predictability because fairness and equity 
require consistent results in similar cases and circumstances.114  
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The lack of clarity in the language of the Clause is evident from the five different 
interpretations it has sprouted in three courts: 1) the Supreme Court majority’s decision in 
Aereo; 2) the Aereo dissenting opinion; 3) the Second Circuit’s interpretation; 4) Judge 
Chin’s opinion in dissent; and 5) the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation.115  The Court of 
Appeals for Aereo and Cablevision focus on the term “performance” when interpreting 
the phrase “capable of receiving the performance or display.”116 Judge Chin in his 
dissent emphasizes that the correct interpretation of the Clause rests on the interpretation 
of the language “any device or process.”117  Although the Supreme Court decision 
should have resulted in a final interpretative method for lower courts to follow, the 
uncertainty and conflicting method suggested by the Supreme Court is only going to 
create further confusion.118  Further, the Supreme Court’s suggested standard would 
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hinder developing technologies because of a lack of reliability in the law.  Even the 
Court, during oral arguments seemed confused as to what standard would apply.119 
Justice Sotomayor agreed that Aereo fit the definition of a cable company, but she further 
questioned that if the Court found Aereo to be a cable company would they be allowed to 
get compulsory licensing that other cable companies receive.120 However, nothing in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion says that Aereo should be entitled to compulsory licensing.121  
2. Effect on Emerging Technology  
The standard adopted in Aereo also implies that no “clear” standard exists for 
determining when a technology company, rather than the user, has engaged in volitional 
conduct.  As Justice Scalia correctly noted the majority opinion’s improvised standard 
will “sow confusion for years to come,” because this unclear method would affect most 
cloud-computing companies negatively even though the Supreme Court suggests 
otherwise.122  
The plain meaning adoption of Aereo’s decision, which finds Aereo to be an 
integrated system that is not in line with copyright, would affect cloud-computing 
companies that are similar to Aereo because they use shared pools of configurable 
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computer resources.  Like all cloud-based platforms, Aereo allows some of the same 
physical equipment to be used independently by multiple consumers, which decreases 
waste and cost.  Consumers increasingly rely on remote equipment to store and access 
online files, including personal copies of copyrighted content like songs and videos.  
The Court implied that the relevant “performance” for the purposes of the 
Transmit Clause is the original broadcast, rather than the individual transmission.123  This 
interpretation aggregates all individual transmissions of a program by individual 
consumers using Aereo.124  Justice Scalia in his dissent noted that if the Court extended 
this aggregation, then it would turn all cloud storage providers into infringers because 
such aggregation blatantly disregards the premise that consumers have a long-established 
right to make personal copies for free.  He also pointed out that the Court failed to 
account for the “salient differences” between cable and Aereo.125 This is an important 
distinction because Cable companies act deliberately and forward a full range of 
broadcast signals to all subscribers at all times, whereas Aereo transmits “specific 
programs selected by the user, at specific times selected by the user.”126  Yet again, the 
Court’s interpretation jeopardizes cloud technologies that are more like Aereo’s passive 
business model than cable.  
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Justice Scalia also suggests that this meaning actively imperils the use of cloud 
technologies to store and access copyrighted content because whenever two users of a 
cloud-based drive separately play a song stored on the server, the provider would be 
liable for publicly performing by transmitting the same underlying performance to 
multiple members of the public even though these are separate copies.127  According to 
him, this makeshift rule will take “decades, to determine which automated systems now 
in existence are governed by the traditional volitional-conduct test and which get the 
Aereo treatment.”128  Following, the legality of cloud-storage technology will remain in 
flux because of the “the imprecision of its result-driven rule”.129 
Although the Court did imply that their decision was narrow and confined to 
“looks-like-cable-TV” type inventions, it did not explain why the performances enabled 
by cloud storage services are “private” under this reading.  Hence, the Court’s solution is 
unworkable to cloud storage services.  By way of example, if a consumer watches a video 
uploaded on Google Drive, while any other consumer is watching the same video on her 
own personal account on Google Drive, then the Court would find Google Drive liable 
for a public performance.  This decision places a heavy burden on storage companies to 
avoid liability because these companies would have to monitor the content stored on its 
system for its use. 
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The Aereo decision provides no guidance regarding how cloud computing 
companies should configure their equipment to avoid being directly liable for their 
consumer’s use of that equipment.130  Cloud technologies generate “enormous 
efficiencies through economies of scale, allowing users to benefit from reduced cost and 
increased reliability,” and “provide[ ] substantial data portability, permitting a user access 
to his or her data via any device with an Internet connection.”131  Cloud technologies are 
also widespread and quickly growing; annual spending has surpassed $50 billion, 
delivering savings to U.S. businesses projected to reach $625 billion over the next five 
years.132 Although this decision vows not to directly impact cloud companies, it 
nevertheless causes confusion as to the future interpretations of the Transmit Clause as 
applicable cloud technology.   
B. Political Reasons 
1. Consumer Choice 
 
Copyright law is not only concerned with protecting rights but also with providing 
maximum benefits for the public.133  Today’s consumer choices reflect the demand for 
services such as Aereo.  Increasingly, consumers are moving towards Internet television 
simply because most cable owners do not have the time to watch every channel that 
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comes with their bundle nor the money to pay the expensive bill.134  Internet TV 
supplemented with services like Netflix and Hulu provide a convenient patchwork of 
services in a cost-effective manner.135   
Technology industry analyst Jeff Kagan says that “[f]or years, we’ve been 
complaining about the uncontrollable rising prices of cable television.”  According to 
HBO Network CEO Jeff Bewkes, “[t]here’s a lot of people out there that want to drop 
multichannel TV, and just have a Netflix or an HBO . . . .”136  This shift to Internet 
television reflects the consumer choice; it shows that they want to pay only for the few 
channels that they want to watch and are likely to watch.137  
Additionally, Internet television provides a service that is missing in all other 
applications (“apps”) – the ability to watch live sports.138  Brian Proffitt, a technology 
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138
expert specializing in enterprise, cloud and big data, suggests that “sports are perhaps the 
biggest reason (on the content side) holding people back from switching away from pay 
TV.”139  The ability to watch broadcasted games that are not covered by cable’s 
expensive media packages is a perk for Internet TV consumers.  
Proffitt also states that “[i]n the transition from land lines to cell phones, it was 
the E911 service that made the decision for us: making sure emergency services knew 
exactly where we were calling from was very important.”  Today, the ability for Internet 
television to provide secure news in times of national disaster might play an equivalent 
role in the transition.  The Emergency Alert System serves as our current national public 
warning system.  It allows broadcast stations, cable systems, satellite radio, Digital 
Broadcast Satellite (“DBS”) systems, participating satellite companies, and other service 
providers to receive and transmit presidential, state and local alerts, and emergency 
information directly to the public.140  However, a few national disasters have shown that 
reliance on cable during national emergencies is now misplaced because physical repairs 
to affected cables take longer than restoring Internet connectivity.141  In the U.S., Internet-
                                                                                                                                                 
  Brian Proffitt, Cable Companies Still Whistling Past The Cord-Cutting 
Graveyard, READWRITE (last updated March 27, 2013), 
http://readwrite.com/2013/03/27/pay-tv-broadcasting-sounds-of-self-denial#awesm=. 
139
  Id. 
140
  Susan S. Kuo, Symposium: Speaking in Tongues: Mandating Multilingual 
Disaster Warnings in the Public Interest,14 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 3. 
141
   See e.g., Zafar Anjum, India's VSNL Helps Restore Internet After Cable Break, 
NETWORK WORLD (Feb. 6, 2008, 9:37 AM), 
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2283092/lan-wan/india-s-vsnl-helps-restore-
based services reflect greater resilience than any other telecommunications method.142  
For example, during Hurricane Katrina and subsequent flooding in Louisiana in 2005, 
landlines, telephone circuits, the State Police radio system, and cellular phone networks 
all failed.143  One local Internet Service Provider was able to maintain some Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone service even during the disaster, and the State Police used 
this to communicate over their intranet.144 Thus, the availability of over the air broadcast 
waves and the Internet’s robustness provides that Internet TV will always be an 
accessible medium in times of emergency because the loss of routing is an easier fix than 
the ubiquitous disruptions caused by physical cable damage.  
C. Technological Reasons 
1. Transmit Clause Does Not Apply To Current State Of Technology 
 
In 1968, cable television’s innovative technology warranted a change in the 
Copyright Act.  Justice Abe Fortas in his dissenting opinion in Fortnightly summarized 
the problem, he stated, “the novelty of the use, incident to the novelty of the new 
technology, results in a baffling problem.  Applying the normal jurisprudential tools – the 
words of the Act, legislative history, and precedent – to the facts of the case is like trying 
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to repair a television set with a mallet.” 145  Once again, the same problem with the new 
technology of Internet TV is at the forefront with Congress’s inability to keep copyright 
legislation up to date in accordance with the speed at which technology has advanced.  In 
1968, the word “performance” in the Copyright Act of 1909 did not reflect the 
development of CATV.146  Congress wrote the 1909 Act “in a different day, for different 
factual situations.”147 Arguably, Congress did not write the 1976 Act keeping the 
technology of today in mind. 
The 1976 Act “took over two decades to negotiate, and was drafted to address 
analog issues and to bring the United States into better harmony with international 
standards, namely the Berne Convention.”148  Although, the Act was an accomplishment 
of its time, today the lack of contemplation for digital transmissions is evident: until 
1998, online service providers were liable under copyright law for the actions of their 
subscribers that they had no control over.149  To remedy that situation, Congress adopted 
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a piecemeal Internet overlay – the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which 
is still an imperfect standard because it was adopted long before cloud storage, 
automobile software, and personal tablets.150 
 
 
Part IV: Proposed Solution 
With new technology emerging and judicial attempts struggling to plug the 
loopholes within the current Act, it is time for Congress to write a new Copyright Act.  
For our society, the Internet has been the most revolutionizing invention and it deserves 
its technological finesse and capabilities be accounted for in the law.151  While the entire 
Copyright Act requires a revision to incorporate the Internet, to address Internet TV in 
particular, Congress must specifically rewrite the public performance right.  The 
ambiguities in the definition of “public,” “performance,” and “transmit” shows the need 
for clarification in the law.  This feat could take years to come as a political gridlock 
hinders any congressional action. 
1. Short Term Solution: Compulsory License 
 
For now, a makeshift legislative remedy is required.  Similar to cable, Internet 
television requires a licensing provision to protect innovations and ward off marketplace 
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failure.152  With the Aereo Court holding Aereo-like technologies liable under the 
Transmit Clause because they look like cable companies, Congress should provide a 
similar subsidy to online television as it once provided for cable in the 1950s.  Although 
the Supreme Court applied a “looks-like-cable-TV” standard for Aereo, nothing in the 
Court’s decision suggests that it should get a compulsory licensing that cable companies 
receive.  A compulsory licensing scheme would allow compensation for broadcasters and 
serve consumer interest in receiving a la carte content.  
In 2008, the Copyright Office looked into a compulsory licensing scheme for 
online broadcast videos.153  Mary Beth Peters, the former Copyright Register, found the 
ability for companies to sidestep private negotiations troublesome.154  However, she did 
note the success of Section 111 as an efficient mechanism to allow the cable industry to 
thrive.155  Moreover, the principal finding in the report suggested that systems that use 
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Internet Protocol to deliver videos are substantially similar to cable systems that already 
use Section 111, and should be subject to the same statutory licensing paradigm.156  
This note does not suggest that Section 111 should be adopted for Internet 
broadcasting.  The model is ill-suited for digital broadcasting because it does not consider 
the complexities of newer technology and is designed for controlling cable providers.  
Congress should adopt a new statutory licensing scheme for the Internet TV industry.  
The Internet’s unique capabilities require licenses specified to protect the growth of 
future innovation, shield lower entry barriers for smaller innovators while adequately 
compensating copyright authors.157  If innovations like Aereo are held liable, then the 
public loses content even though it fits into the statutory copyright scheme.  Because 
Aereo looks and acts like cable, but is not considered cable, it does not reap the rewards 
as other cable providers, yet is regulated like cable without a statutory license.  
Under Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., Broadcasters are not 
allowed to claim copyright royalties when a consumer accesses and makes a personal 
copy of the local broadcast because a personal copy is a quintessential fair use.158  
Further, Congress exempted cable systems from any obligation to compensate copyright 
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holders when they retransmitted broadcast programming already available to cable 
subscribers over the air.  Thus, Congress recognized that retransmission of programming 
within the original broadcast market “does not injure the copyright owner,” who 
“contracts with the [broadcaster] on the basis of his programming reaching [its audience] 
and is compensated accordingly.”159  When Congress enacted Section 111, copyright 
holders could claim royalties only when cable system retransmitted local programming to 
a “distant” audience.160  Royalties for local or national network programming are not 
available for copyright holders under Section 111.161  
Congress has repeatedly intended not to include retransmissions of content that 
are already available and paid in the statutory licensing scheme.162  For example, in 1995, 
when Congress created a digital performance right in sound recordings it exempted 
retransmissions of broadcast radio within one hundred and fifty miles of the original 
broadcast.163  In 1999, in Section 122 for satellite retransmission, Congress exempted 
royalties if the re-transmitters were offering the transmissions only to the local 
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subscribers, in-market, “because the works have already been licensed, and paid for with 
respect to viewers in those local markets.”164  
Congress continually has stepped in between the cable industry and broadcasters 
to regulate competition.  Cable’s free reign over retransmission of local broadcaster 
signals once again caused Congress to interfere and create the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the “Cable Act”), a cable-specific 
statute.  Congress passed the Cable Act because of a lack of competition in the cable 
industry that caused the average monthly cable rates to skyrocket.165  The Cable Act 
ensured that competitors such as satellite and wireless cable delivery systems, had access 
to popular cable programming that they had been denied in the past.166 Further, the Cable 
Act allowed local broadcast stations two options either to negotiate for retransmission 
consent or to take guaranteed carriage under the “must carry” provision.  Prior to this law, 
cable systems used broadcast signals without station consent and resold the signals to 
subscribers—making millions.167 Retransmission consent requires cable systems to 
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obtain permission from broadcasters before carrying their programming.168 Congress 
enacted the Cable Act to prevent a competitive imbalance between the two industries and 
required that broadcasters could either keep their must carry status or enter into 
negotiations with cable operators.169  Eventually, the Cable Act became a subsidy for the 
national broadcast networks. 
Congress acknowledged that broadcasters’ interest in their signals and the 
copyright holder’s interest in the programming contained on the signal were 
distinguished and “[t]he principles that underlie the compulsory copyright license of 
Section 111 . . . are undisturbed by this legislation.”170  The Cable Act was not “intended 
to affect Federal copyright law.”171   
The new license scheme should reflect the current video programming 
marketplace and provide bright line rules for retransmission of digital signals.  
Additionally, the new license should look to the intent of Section 111.  
At its inception, Section 111 served its purpose and made it easier for cable to 
clear programming rights carried on distant broadcast signals.  Long ago, cable, as a 
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nascent industry, needed the Section 111 subsidy to compete on even terms with 
broadcasters.  Today, cable no longer requires such a subsidy, but rather Internet TV finds 
itself in a hostile marketplace because its existence threatens damage to the broadcast 
industry.  
For the proposed new licensing scheme, Congress should allow Internet TV 
providers to retransmit local television signals on a royalty-free basis.  This would 
provide local television broadcast to Internet TV users and promote competition between 
Internet TV providers and broadcasters.  This approach would work well for the proposed 
licensing scheme because, “Congress has repeatedly determined that the retransmission 
of local television stations by cable systems and satellite carriers does not harm copyright 
owners where they are adequately compensated in their direct licensing agreements with 
broadcasters.”172 
The new license would update and harmonize existing statutory license by 
allowing fees only for distant signal and not local transmissions.  Because the effect of 
local retransmissions is dubious and broadcasters are typically compensated through 
advertising and not the recipients of the broadcast, a license eliminating fees for local 
transmissions would not harm the broadcasters.  
Financing of broadcast television is accomplished primarily through advertising 
and retransmission fees.  Since Internet retransmission of broadcast content cannot 
remove the accompanying advertisements and it presents the content unaltered, a 
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broadcaster would not suffer because the intended audience would still be receiving the 
advertisements.  
 The loss of retransmission fees from cable companies would harm broadcasters.  
However, requiring broadcasters to swallow this cost in order to provide a public benefit 
and secure innovation would be a worthwhile exchange.  Without the ability to stream 
content, the Internet TV industry will not be given the appropriate incentive to develop 
further.  Although cost-effective services like Aereo may induce users to leave their 
traditional cable companies thereby resulting in a loss of retransmission fees for 
broadcasters, this result does not justify preventing the public from receiving their desired 
content because copyright holders denied retransmission permission.  Allowing Internet 
TV to retransmit broadcasters’ signals would greatly increase the flow of information.  
Local news, community building, sports, and critical information during emergencies 
would be more readily available for thirty million Americans that do not have access to 
cable or satellite.173  
A compulsory license would reduce the extent to which copyright ownership 
would monopolize the creations and access of innovations in that industry.  Mitigation of 
monopolistic behavior is the strongest argument for adoption of the proposed compulsory 
licensing scheme.174  A group of scholars asserts “[t]he general theory of a competitive 
                                                 
173
  See Television Viewers, Retransmission Consent, and the Public Interest: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Commc’n, Tech., & the Internet of the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. 4, 17 (2010) (statement of Chase Carey, Deputy 
Chairman, Pres., & COO, The News Corp.). 
174
free market economy shows that monopoly will reduce overall welfare by providing 
distorted price signals to consumers, causing them to purchase the wrong combination of 
goods and services to maximize their welfare.”175  A license would simply make the 
information more readily available for others to stimulate the production of more 
technology and innovation.  The compelled licensing regime will reward the broadcasters 
while enabling subsequent Internet TV developers to innovate the available signals 
further without incurring deterrent costs or facing an entry barrier set by the copyright 
holder’s inability to negotiate.   
 This license would commence for a temporary five-year term, allowing 
reevaluation of the market in five years and allowing Congress time to test changes for 
the video programming industry on a smaller scale, which in turn would effectuate a 
successful rewrite of the Copyright Act.  Such a license will cure the imbalance that has 
resulted from the Aereo decision, which effectively decapitated any hope for future 
innovations for Internet television.  
2. Long Term Solution: “Device-Shifting” Fair Use 
This note also proposes that technological fair use should apply to Aereo and 
other similar technologies under the concept of “device-shifting.”  Technological fair use 
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is a new sect of case law emerging from the fair use doctrine.176  Technological fair use 
deals with not only the legality of certain uses of copyrighted works but also, the legality 
of emerging technologies that affect innovation and the U.S. economy.177  
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. is the landmark case that 
found time shifting to constitute as technological fair use.  In Sony, movie studios sued to 
block the sale of Sony’s Betamax videocassette recorder (VCR), they argued that Sony 
was liable because its customers were making unauthorized copies.178 The Supreme 
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that home time-shifting recordings were permissible fair 
use and the VCR technology was legal because of its substantial non-infringing uses.179 
Thirty years ago, in Sony, the Court “came within one vote of declaring VCR 
Contraband” because the VCR technology had the directly threatened the television and 
movie industries.180 If the Sony Court decided the other way, then billions of dollars in 
revenue for the VCR, Video Rental, and Video Camera markets would never have been 
realized.181 Broadcast Networks made similar calamitous predictions about Aereo and the 
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Court supported that conclusion by stifling technological innovation in their Aereo 
decision.182   
A finding of fair use in Aereo would have created an innovative legal standard.  
Fair use would have offered two things: (1) fair use would have obviated a compulsory 
licensing need, which could benefit not only Aereo, but also other entities and cloud 
technologies seeking to build similar programs; and (2) fair use would have provided 
copyright holders more mediums to display their work.  Consequently, Congress should 
amend the Copyright Act to provide a bright-line technological device-shifting fair use 
exception.  
In Sony, the Court made some influential pronouncements about personal use 
copying and the fair use doctrine that can be applied to the Aereo decision.  Personal use 
copying includes things such as making time-shifted copies of television programs to 
watch them later or loading the music from a purchased CD onto one’s computer.183 
Internet TV systems such as Aereo do nothing more than redirect or device-shift the 
broadcaster signals from the cable box to an iPad, computer, or device of your choice that 
has internet connection.  Currently, such device-shifting technologies are readily 
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available in products such as Slingbox, TiVo and others that provide retransmission of 
content across different devices.184  
While the VCR allowed society to watch programming at a later time, device-
shifting technologies allow users to watch programming in different locations.  Device-
shifting technologies allow its consumers to make productive uses.  Now users can evade 
the television box, and even geographic boundaries that restrict TV to the living room.  
These devices provide access to already purchased content or content that is freely 
available through over-the-air broadcasts, as in Sony.  
Aereo shares similar functionality to the VCR and its successors like Slingbox.  
However, similar to the VCR, Aereo and other cloud technologies will face comparable 
challenges to legalize their inventions.  Aereo only provides access to over-the-air 
broadcasts, which are public domain, but with the additional Internet streaming option.185  
While more consumers recognize the benefits of device-shifting, judicial 
decisions that threaten the future use of such technology are against the purpose and 
traditional intent of copyright law.  Allowing courts to interpret the law in favor of 
broadcasters does nothing more than tip the balance towards broadcasters’ monopolistic 
control under the copyright law.  Thus, Congress should adopt a fair use legislative 
remedy that eliminates the discrepancies in copyright law. 
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Technological fair use legislation would allow innovators to further improve 
technology, and the public would benefit with the innovations.  Fair use should be applied 
uniformly in the technological area given the complexity of many cases.  The fair use 
principles laid out in Sony require strengthening with Congress playing a more central 
role in advancing content and technology.  
In strengthening the fair use doctrine for technology, Congress should make a 
definitive legislation that legalizes device-shifting fair use.  By providing such an 
exception, Congress would promote a clear advancement of technology and limit the 
scope of the copyright owner’s rights, in contrast to the tendency of current case law, 
which has broadened the reach of copyright holders.  
Congress should adopt device-shifting fair use for similar reasons that time-
shifting fair use was deemed acceptable.  Under the fair use analysis, the burden of 
proving harm or an adverse effect on the market for the copyrighted work rests on the 
complainant.  The Sony Court, in justifying time-shifting fair use, stated that advertising 
revenue would not be lost because advertisements would still appear on the recorded 
tapes.186 Internet streaming of free over-the-air broadcast content adheres to the same 
logic.  Aereo was taking advantage of free public airwaves and this cannot constitute 
copyright infringement absent a likelihood of harm.  Even if courts are able to find some 
potential harm, their ultimate decision should rest on an interpretation of the Copyright 
Act, which encourages technological innovation not monopolies.  Thus, a device-shifting 
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exception would create a positive impact on the manufacturer, the public, as well as 
advancements in technology.  
Part V: Conclusion 
The state of copyright law is insufficient and piecemeal judicial decisions are only 
adding to the confusion.  The law is failing to keep up with the advancing technologies.  
These, technological advances are essential to our society.  New technologies provide an 
incentive for investment and innovation.  Consequently, protection of this technology is 
indispensable to protect the fruit of a copyright owner’s labors.  However, overprotection 
of technology is as harmful as under protecting it.  It is critical that copyright law 
adequately keep pace with technological developments and society.  
The Aereo decision may have stirred the pot regarding the legality of Internet 
streaming, but Congress should have the last word in the matter.  Without statutory 
intervention, the Aereo decision has threatened newer technology and sent many 
technology providers searching for alternative loopholes to legally provide their much-
needed services.  
Congress has two options to satiate the purpose of the Copyright Act, which 
requires balancing the protection of copyrighted works against the incentive of creators to 
advance technologies.  Congress can either allow a compulsory license for Internet TV, 
which would mitigate the monopolistic behavior of copyright holders and broadcasters.  
This proposed license is consistent with the purpose of the copyright laws and prior uses 
of compulsory licensing.  Alternatively, Congress can enact technological fair use 
legislation that would allow technologies such as Aereo to develop more and allow 
subscribers a better option for television consumption.  It is time that Congress must 
reconsider the existing laws in the face of growing technology and speed up the 
inevitable television revolution. 
 
 
 
